Introduction
Overconfidence -individuals' tendency to overestimate their abilities and information -has been documented by a large body of psychology literature [see for example Fiscoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1977) , Alpert and Raiffa (1982) ]. In finance, it has been incorporated into models of asymmetric information to rationalize a set of long standing asset-pricing 'anomalies'. For example, Odean (1998) shows that in a variety of models overconfidence leads to excess trading volume, and in some settings can also lead to higher price volatility and lower price quality. Daniel et al. (1998) find that overconfidence can cause positive returns autocorrelation in the short run (e.g., momentum) and negative returns autocorrelation in the long-run. In these settings, overconfident agents exhibit inefficient information processing as they overweight a particular information set compared with what a perfectly Bayesian agent would do. For example, an overconfident agent may overweight her private signal relative to the information revealed by aggregate quantities (e.g., prices).
In this paper, we suggest an alternative reason that may cause agents to rationally 'overweight' their information: they respond to the errors of others. If some people make mistakes by failing to follow a fully-rational behavior, then aggregate quantities, which facilitate the process of information transmission, may contain errors [see Akerlof and Yellen (1985) ]. In such case, a rational agent would strategically respond to these errors [see Camerer (2003)] by discounting the informativeness of fellow traders' actions and overweighting their own private signal.
To examine these issues, we devise a simple, non-strategic, information-aggregation game focused on how agents process private information and learn from each other. In the game there are two players. Each receives (1) a private signal, and (2) a private-signal precision. The players' task is to estimate an unknown fundamental value, around which their signals are drawn. The game consists of multiple decision turns in which players first observe each others' previously submitted estimates and then simultaneously submit new ones. Players' payoffs do not come from trading but rather depend on the accuracy of their individual estimates. Therefore, players' estimates are a solution to a Bayesian updating problem in which private information is weighted relative to the information learned from the other players' estimates. The more confidence a player has in her private information, the less she adjusts her estimates across turns. Over time (under full rationality), players are predicted to perfectly aggregate their private information, converging to the Rational Expectations level.
We extend the fully-rational baseline model in two ways. First, we derive best-reponses when players are overconfident. In this case, players' confidence in their private signal exceeds their objective signal precision. Second, we derive players' best-responses when interacting with others prone to have mean-zero errors. We show that in this case, players discounts observed estimates of others. In both cases, we find that the level of 'disagreement' among players, measured by their estimates' dispersion, exceeds the fully-raional benchmark.
We conduct experimental sessions in which subjects participate in the information aggregation game described above and are rewarded in cash based on their decisions. Private signal precision (high or low) is determined by the subjects' rank on a task that takes place at the beginning of sessions. In some sessions, denoted as baseline treatment (BLT), participants roll a die and privately observed the outcome. In other sessions, denoted as overconfidence treatment (OCT), participants answer a short SAT quiz, similar to a treatment used by Camerer and Lovallo (1999) . In both treatments subjects are not told what their rank is but are made aware of the way it is determined. While the die roll is a neutral treatment, the SAT is not; many previous studies document the tendency of individuals to perceive themselves as 'better than average' [e.g., Svenson (1981) ]. Therefore, subjects who mistakenly believe that they are better than their peers on the SAT quiz will also mistakenly believe that their signal precision is better than it really is. They will be overconfident about their private signal -not by conjecture, but rather by the experimental design.
We use the observed adjustment rates to back out subjects' implied confidence in their signal and compare those to the objective precisions. We find that, consistent with the treatment design, subjects are (on average) overconfident in the OCT but not in the BLT.
In particular, overconfidence seems to be concentrated among subjects that have the lowest signal precision. Furthermore, observed overconfidence seem to have an adverse effect on information aggregation. Comparing the results across treatments, we find that in the OCT esrtimates' dispersions is substantially higher and the rate of estimates' convergence is lower.
However, comparing the results in the BLT with the predictions of the fully rational model, we find deviations that are qualitatively similar to the differences across treatments. To explain this, we estimate an extension of the fully rational model which accounts for best responses to errors and find support for it.
The information aggregation game used in this paper abstracts from many aspects typically embedded in trading markets such as risk-sharing, portfolio choice, strategic behavior, and optimal order submission. Central to the game's tractability is the fact that participants' payoffs are not a fixed sum (as is the case when trading is involved). As such, the game does not generate prices, allocations and trading volume, and therefore cannot be used to provide direct observation on these quantities. We are able to derive a tractable model that captures how players integrate information obtained privately with information indirectly revealed to them from aggregate quantities. We focus on this aspect since it captures the channel through which overconfidence is hypothesized to affect agents' decisions in markets.
The results obtained in this paper can be relevant to the study of overconfidence in financial markets in a number of ways. First, it shows that the two sources for inefficient learning -overconfidence and errors -can have economically similar effects on aggregation of information. Models of overconfidence could benefit from including the two sources of inefficiencies and providing predictions that separately identify them. Second, the mechanism studied in this paper shares some important features with markets populated by asymmetrically informed agents. In both cases, the object of interest is the way private information is mapped into agents' valuation of the underlying asset. While the mechanism connecting the inputs and outputs differs, in both cases it relies on Bayesian updating to determine how agents weight their private information with that implied from others' behavior. 1 As such, our findings shed light on the ways deviations from rationality affect this updating.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the related literature. Section 3 sets up the theoretical model and derives the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. Section 4 describes the experimental design mirroring this model. Section 5 analysis and discusses the results. We summarize in Section 6.
Literature Review
In this section we focus on the most closely related experimental and psychology work on overconfidence, at the individual and market level, and relate it to our paper. In the interest of brevity, we omit a number of strands of literature at the sphere of this paper including theoretical asset pricing models studying the effect of traders' overconfidence and work on social learning (see Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1998) for a survey).
Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) measure individuals' miscalibration and how it is affected by trading. They allow subjects to trade securities that pay stochastic dividends over a number of periods in double-auction markets. At the beginning of each period, subjects are asked to provide an assessment of the distribution of trading prices to be observed during the period. The authors use these predictions to construct two different measures of overconfidence. They find substantial heterogeneity in subjects' levels of over/underconfidence but find no aggregate overconfidence. Biais et. al. (2002) correlate individual measures of overconfidence and self-monitoring, collected through surveys at the beginning of sessions, to their earnings from trading in an asset market similar to the one described in Plott and Sunder (1988) . Absent private values, this setting is subject to winner's curse since participants hold imperfect private information. Thus, no-trade results apply. The authors find that subjects prone to overconfidence generate relatively low earnings and those that exhibit high self-monitoring abilities generate relatively high earnings. At the same time, they do not find that overconfidence leads to more intense trading.
Deaves, Luders and Luo (2003) study the link between miscalibration, gender and trading intensity. The authors design an experiment in which subjects' signal quality depends on the accuracy of their responses on a survey. They find that overconfidence leads to increased trading activity among subjects. In contrast with other studies, they find no difference in overconfidence and trading intensity between men and women. There are a number of important differences between these papers and our study. First, we measure participants' over/under-confidence that is implicit in their decisions by estimating a structural model of behavior. That is, instead of using direct elicitation, we estimate revealed miscalibration as it applies in the information aggregation game studies here. As a result, our approach is more robust to survey methodology; it is quite possible that while individuals are not able to communicate probabilistic assessments well, they are able to incorporate them into their decisions.
Second, the game played here differs substantially from the canonical double-auction markets, used by virtually all experimental asset markets. The tractability of our mechanism allows us to study a rich set of aggregate measures and to generate clear level predictions.
In contrast, most previous work almost exclusively dealt with comparative static tests. For example, no study that we know of looks at the effect of overconfidence on the precision of agents' valuation of the underlying asset, while it is clearly of central interest to economists.
Third, most previous work in this area follows the approach of correlating individuals' psychological attributes and their behavior in markets. As such, it was centered on individual level results. Our focus is on making some initial steps towards understanding the aggregation process of individuals' biases.
The experimental design in our paper makes use of two distinct forms of overconfidence: miscalibration and better-than-average-effect. Both forms have been studied extensively in cognitive psychology. Miscalibration refers to individuals' tendency to overestimate the accuracy of their knowledge [see Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips (1982) for a review].
Studies of miscalibration typically involve the elicitation of confidence intervals: Subjects are presented with a set of open ended questions (e.g., "how much does a fully-loaded Boeing 747 weigh?") and asked to provide a range of values such that they are 90% confident that the unknown quantity would fall inside the stated range. Evidence suggests that subjects report too narrow confidence intervals resulting in substantially lower fraction of answers landing inside the intervals than 90%. An alternative design presents subjects with multiplechoice questions and asks subjects to estimate the probability that the answer they pick is correct. Once again, in aggregate, the fraction of correct answers is lower than the stated probabilities. Studies of the better than average effect suggest that people are overconfident about their ability relative to others. For example, Svenson (1981) , asked groups of subjects to compare their driving ability (skill and safety) to their peers in a group. Around 70-80% rated themselves as above median. This phenomenon has been documented in various other areas: health [Larwood (1978) ], managerial skills [Larwood and Whittaker (1977) ], business success [Cooper et al. (1988) ]. While we do not suggest that in general these two forms of overconfidence are related, we make use of the better than average effect to generate miscalibration: Since subjects overestimate their relative ability to answer correctly the SAT quiz questions, they should also overestimate the precision of their private signal.
Theory

General
In this game there are two players, both trying to estimate the realization of a random variable v, referred to as 'fundamental value', where v is distributed uniformly between L and H. Each player is assigned a type: t i ∈ {h, l} such that one player is of type h and the other is of the complementary type, l. A player of type h receives a perfect signal while a player of type l receives an imperfect signal: 2
• Perfect signal: highest q is assigned to be type h while the other player is assigned to be type l. For player i, the probability that she is of type h is q i , since Pr (q j < q i |q i ) = q i .
For now, assume that subject's belief about the probability that she is of type h, denoted by q i , is correct (i.e., q i = q i ). Thus, the realization {s i , q i } makes up subject i's private information set.
The game consists of 3 stages: at the beginning of each turn, t, both players simultaneously submit an action, a i , t , which comes in the form of a numerical estimate of the realized fundamental value. At the end of each turn, both players' estimates are announced. As we show later, 3 turns are needed for players to arrive at the fully-revealing equilibrium. The intuition is straightforward. There are two dimensions of uncertainty for each player -the other player's signal and her signal precision. Since each turn can allow for at most one new dimension to be observed, players need to observe each others' estimates for two turns, arriving at full-revelation in turn 3.
At the end of the game one turn is randomly chosen (with equal probability) and players receive a payoff π i (a i,t , v) ensuring that expected utility is maximized at the expected value
, where I i,t represents player i's information set (both private and public) in turn t. Put differently, the payoff scheme ensures that if players act myopically, they minimize the forecasting error at each turn of the game. Note that each player is paid according to the accuracy of her actions, irrespective of the actions of the other player. Hence, this is not a fixed sum game (unlike most trading institutions).
This feature is important in neutralizing payoff externalities typically arising in market settings and removing strategic incentives.
Optimal Actions: Full Rationality
We start by characterizing the fully-rational solution of this game for players i, j, denoted by a * i , a * j . Recall that the game starts with the players receiving their private information, {s i , q i }, followed by three decision turns. Since the exogenous information is fixed across the turns, subjects revise their estimates due to endogenous information only, obtained by observing other's actions. Also, since exactly one player is perfectly informed but the identity of that player is uncertain, optimal actions are a convex combination of players' signals. How far one's estimate is from her signal would depend on the confidence she has in her signal.
While we characterize the solution for the full range of signals in Appendix 7.1.1, in this section we focus on the 'interior case' where
The interior case gives rise to tractable predictions, allows one to obtain clear intuition about the dynamics of this game, and can be made arbitrarily large relative to the 'exterior case'. 3
Proposition 1 There exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in pure strategies where:
See 
Proposition 2
The pure strategy equilibrium in proposition 1 is unique.
The intuition for the uniqueness result is that players' payoffs are not a fixed sum.
Therefore, they can not do better than to provide their Bayesian estimates of v at each turn of the game. They would deviated from this strategy if they could learn faster the information the other player holds, but this is not feasible.
In the game, information is aggregated sequentially. In turn one, optimal action depends on one's own signal. In turn two, optimal action depends on one's own signal as well as the other's observed t = 1 action and own subjective confidence. To measure the information aggregation rate, we focus on the level of 'disagreement' between players, which we call 'estimates' dispersion'. 4 Definition 3 We define Estimates' Dispersion as ED t = |a i,t − a j,t | Proposition 4 Estimates' dispersion strictly decreases from turn 1 to 3 (a.s.).
This result is intuitive: if players aggregate information, then their information sets will get closer together over time. Since estimates are functions of these sets, estimates too will get closer together. At the first turn, since players' estimates are equal to their signals, the dispersion depends on the realization of the signals. At the second turn, dispersion decreases since players' estimates are a convex combination of their own signal and the initial estimate of the other player. At the third turn, both players submit the same estimate, bringing the dispersion to zero.
Optimal Actions: Miscalibration
Recall that we are interested in understanding the effects of errors in beliefs and errors in actions on players' best responses. In this part we will address the former by allowing for the possibility that players hold erroneous beliefs about the probability of being perfectly informed. That is, we set the individual subjective probability to be equal to the objective probability plus miscalibration:
Positive miscalibration represents overconfidence while negative miscalibration represents underconfidence. We allow for arbitrary subjective beliefs as long as they are
To simplify matters, let us assume that subjects are naive in the sense that they are not aware of other players' potential miscalibration (this assumption will be maintained throughout this paper). 6 In the following part, we discuss the effect of miscalibration on 4 Results not reported here also analyzed estimates' imprecision, a measure of the distance between the average estimate and v. Most of the qualitative predictions carry over to this measure too. 5 This definition corresponds to the way miscalibration is defined in the cognitive psychology literature [see Alpert and Raiffa (1977) for a review]. 6 We naturally assume that players are not aware of their own miscalibration [see for example Odean (1998) ].
the aggregation of information as measured by estimates' dispersion (denoting this case with superscript M ).
Proposition 5
If players' miscalibration is equal to M C i and M C j then estimates' dispersion is given by:
In this setting, miscalibration should not affect estimates' dispersion in the first turn.
This is because first turn estimates do not reflect players' subjective confidence in their own signals. For the same reason, miscalibration would impact estimates' dispersion in the second turn. Since both players regard their subjective beliefs to be equal to the objective precisions of their signals, they would converge on the signal held by the player with the higher subjective probability. Therefore, turn 3 estimates' dispersion would be zero. Next, if
we compare the level of estimates' dispersion in the presence and absence of miscalibration.
Proposition 6
The expected level of estimates' dispersion is (weakly) greater in the presence of average overconfidence for all turns (a.s.).
In the first and last run of the game, overconfidence should not have an effect on estimates' dispersion. However, if players are on average overconfident, i.e., M C i + M C j > 0, turn 2 estimates should be further apart. Each player would adjust her estimate too little toward the estimate of the other player, compared with the fully-rational case.
Optimal Actions: Rational Response to Errors
We now study the second form of deviation from full-rationality. We ask: what should player i's best response be if she knows that player j's actions include some error? We address this by following the spirit of the probabilistic choice model of Goeree and Holt (1999) , and
McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1998) , in which players' actions are distributed around their best-responses; best responses are formed while taking into account that others' actions include mean-zero errors.
Specifically, we let player j's observed action be composed of her fully-rational optimal action, as derived in Section 3.2, plus a mean-zero error:
While player i cannot observe player j's error, she at least accounts for the fact that these errors have magnitude σ 1 . Therefore, player i's best response in turn 2 is not only a function of her information set I i,2 but also of the error magnitude σ 1 :
Let us assume that subjects' observed actions are normally distributed around the optimal action in that turn. This assumption automatically satisfies the condition that the probability of observing deviations from best response is inversely related to their cost since the payoff function used in the experiment has the same functional form as the normal density (both are negative quadratic exponential). As such, this assumption is economically appealing.
After some calculations (see page 29 of the Appendix for derivation), we obtain that:
To interpret this expression, we contrast it with the solution obtained in the fully-rational model, a i,2 = q i s i + (1 − q i )a j,1 . Notice that subject i's response in turn 2 to the actions of player j in turn 1 is now adjusted relative to the fully rational case. This adjustment becomes larger the further player j's actions are from player i's signal. The reason is that "extreme" estimates are more likely to include a large error term, relative to "moderate" estimates. Therefore, the informativeness of extreme estimates should be discounted. 4 Experimental Design
General
The experiment was run at the Haas School of Business, University of California at Berkeley: a total of 12 sessions were conducted in which 72 subjects participated; 5 were Baseline Treatment (BLT) and 7 were Overconfidence Treatment (OCT). 7 Subjects were recruited from undergraduate classes at the University of California at Berkeley and had no previous experience with similar experiments. They received a show-up payment of $5 and an addi-tional performance-based pay of $0-$10, which was paid in private and in cash at the end of the session. Sessions were about 60-minutes long and included 6 participants each.
At the beginning of each session an administrator read the instructions aloud and answered questions in private. 8 Each subject entered their decision using a computerized interface, which was built for the purpose of this experiment (see figure 2) , thus maintaining both isolation and anonymity. 9 
Structure
Each session started with an initial phase, followed by 10 independent and identical rounds. 10 At the beginning of each round, subjects were randomly assigned into 'markets' consisting of two players each and were presented with their private signal. Each round was composed of 4 decision turns and for each turn, each subject was asked to enter her decision. 11 Throughout the turns, subjects' pairing and private information remained the same. Tran- 8 Instructions are available upon request. 9 The application developed by the author for this experiment is available upon request. 10 We report here the results from the first 10 rounds while a few sessions were conducted with more rounds.
11 While the 4th turn is redundant under the fully rational model it need not be redundant in practice. We also run 2 sessions (not reported here) with 6 decision turns but behavior during the last two turns seemed very close to the one exhibited in turn 4.
sition from one turn to the next occurred only after all subjects submitted their decisions.
No time restriction was imposed.
The experiment was carried out along a single treatment: base-line treatment (BLT) or overconfidence treatment (OCT), which differed only in their initial phase. In the BLT, the initial phase consisted of subjects privately throwing a die and observing its outcome. 12 Draws were recorded by the administrator and fed into the computer which then determined the rank of the draws; three of the subjects, with the highest draws, were classified as 'perfectly informed' while the other three, with the lowest draws were classified as 'imperfectly informed' (ties were resolved randomly). Subjects observed their own draw but did not observe the draws obtained by other participants.
In the OCT, subjects were asked to answer 20 multiple-choice SAT questions (taken from sample tests that were posted on the CollegeBoard website). Scores were recorded by the computer which then ranked subjects according to the number of correct answers, as a primary key, and by the length of time required to complete the quiz, as a secondary key; three of the subjects, ranked top, were classified as 'perfectly informed' while the other three were classified as 'imperfectly informed'.
In both treatments subjects were not told what their rank was but were made aware of the way it was determined. Altering the procedure by which precision of signals was determined was designed to make subjects overconfident (on average) about their private signal in the OCT. While the die throw is a neutral treatment, the SAT is not; many previous studies document the tendency of individuals to perceive themselves as 'better than average' [e.g., Svenson (1981) ]. Therefore, subjects who mistakenly believe that they are better than their peers on the SAT quiz will also mistakenly believe that their signal precision is better than it really is. They will be overconfident about their private signalnot by conjecture, but rather by the experimental design.
The choice of using SAT questions was deliberate and intended to bias the results in favor of the null of no treatment effect by facing subjects with a task with which they are familiar. All subjects have taken the SAT test before and were aware of their performance relative to their peer group.
Information
At the beginning of each round a quantity v was drawn by the computer, where v ∼ U [50, 950]. Then, subjects received independent signals. Subjects classified as 'perfectly informed' received a signal equal to the realization of v (i.e., e i = 0). Subjects classified as 'imperfectly informed' received a signal equals to v + e i , where e i ∼ U [−30, 30].
All information was continuously displayed on subjects' interfaces for them to observe.
Note that aside from the information specified above, no additional feedback was given. In particular, the realization of the unknown quantity, v, was not revealed at any stage of the experiment (not even at the end of the round) and subjects did not see their earnings until the end of the session. This may be likened to an environment where traders never get to observe the liquidating value; subjects can only learn from their interaction with other players, not from exogenous cues. 13 
Assignment
Pairing into markets was randomly determined while ensuring that exactly one subject was perfectly informed and the other one was imperfectly informed. This is important for three reasons: (1) it makes ex-ante distribution of information equal across all market instances, (2) it disables subjects from easily unveiling their type, and (3) it allows posterior probability updating to take on a particularly simple and intuitive form. 14,15
Decisions and payoffs
At the beginning of each turn, t, subjects simultaneously submit their estimates a i,t by entering a number on their screen. No restrictions are imposed on the value the estimate could take. Upon receiving submissions from both subjects, the turn comes to an end and no changes are accepted. At that point subjects are informed of each others' estimate and are allowed a short transition time into the next turn.
At the end of the session, one turn from each round was randomly drawn and earnings (for subject i in round r) were calculated as follows:
where we set c 1 = 100, c 2 = 50. At the end of the experiment, the number of points earned is converted into dollars using an exchange rate of 100 to 1 and subjects are paid in private and in cash. Average earnings (including the show-up fee) are $12 with standard deviation of $3.5.
The payoff function in Equation 4
is chosen for a number of reasons. First, its convexity ensures that payoffs were non-negative everywhere. This is desirable because of the bankruptcy possibility arising from subjects submitting estimates that are distant from the fundamental value (due to errors). Generally, bankruptcy is nonenforceable in the lab and once encountered may influence subjects' decisions in a substantial manner and may result in loss of experimental control [see Friedman and Sunder (1994) ]. Second, the symmetry of payoffs around the fundamental value suggests to subjects that they should submit estimates that minimize estimation error. Indeed, the instructions reinforce this idea by stating that "the more precise your guesses are the more money you will earn at the end of the experiment".
Results
Overconfidence
The game allows us to study how players incorporate their signal prevision beliefs into their estimates. While we cannot directly observe subjects' beliefs, we can estimate them from the sequence of their observed decisions. Specifically, since subject i's turn-2 optimal action, under miscalibration, is given by q i s i + (1 − q i )a j,1 , we estimate the following regression model:
Treating the data as a panel and clustering errors by subjects, we estimate Equation 5
for each treatment. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 report the results. Under the null, subjects should put equal weight on their signal and on the other subjects' first turn estimates, i.e., β 1 = β 2 = 0.5. The results from the BLT are inline with this prediction; the average weight assigned to own signals and to the others' estimates are 0.55 and 0.45, respectively.
Thus, we cannot reject the null that in the BLT, subjects are well calibrated. In contrast, the results from the OCT suggest that subjects significantly overweight their own signal:
72 and β 2 = 0.28. We can reject the null that subjects are well calibrated in the OCT in favor of the alternative that they are overconfident.
To further explore the attributes of overconfidence we back out subjects' signal precision beliefs from the rate at which estimates are adjusted across turns. Rearranging the expression for player i's best-response in turn 2,
.
To see how we interpret this quantity consider two extreme cases. In the first case, subject i does not adjust her turn-2 estimate (i.e., a i,2 = s 1 ). This behavior implies that i is sure to hold the perfect signal; indeed q i would equal 1 in this case. In the second case, subject i adjusts her turn-2 estimate all the way towards subject j's estimate (i.e., a i,2 = a j,2 ). This reflects that subject i believes subject j holds the perfect signal; q i would equal 0 in this case. Figure 4 depicts the average implied confidence across treatments (BLT and OCT) while grouping subjects by their objective precision. 16 Objective precision is computed by bootstrapping the performance across subjects from the initial task (i.e., SAT). A subject who obtained X correct answers in the quiz was assigned an objective precision that corresponds to the probability that another subject, randomly drawn, would have obtained less than X correct answers on the quiz.
First, subjects' objective precisions are related to their implied confidence levels. This is true for both treatments. For example, in the BLT, subjects with low objective precision (0 to 1/3) have an implied confidence of 13% compared with 51% for subjects with average objective precision (1/3 to 2/3) and 89% for subjects with high objective precision (2/3 to 1). The same qualitative relation between objective precision and implied confidence is observed in the OCT.
Second, overconfidence is concentrated among subjects that are the least informed in the OCT. For each objective precision group, we test the null that the implied confidence is equal to the objective precision. For each subject, we average the implied confidence across rounds and compare it with her objective precision. Therefore, each subject is treated as a single observation. With this conservative use of data, we can reject the null that the poorly informed subjects in the OCT are well calibrated at the 1% significance level. To get a sense for the magnitude of these subjects' overconfidence we compare them to their peers in the BLT. We find that the former have almost 4 times higher confidence in their private information than the latter.
Estimates' Dispersion
Aggregation of Information
Theory predicts that players aggregate and disseminate private information across turns by observing each others' estimates. Therefore, estimates' dispersion, ED r,t , which is the absolute value of the difference between players' estimates in a given turn, |a i,t − a j,t |, decreases across turns. That is, players' estimates get closer together over turns.
To test this prediction, we calculate the average level of estimates' dispersion across turns and treatments (reported in Table 2 ). The results suggests that subjects aggregate information in both treatments. We see that estimates' dispersion level decreases across turns in both treatments. In the BLT estimates' dispersion level start at around 17.6 decreasing to 5.0 by the fourth turn. In the OCT, estimates' dispersion level starts at around 17.0 and decreases to to about 9.7 by the forth turn. To obtain a feel for the magnitude of the results, recall that in each instance of the game there is exactly one subject who receives a perfect signal and another subject who receives an imperfect signal.
Since the imperfect signal is uniformly distributed around the liquidating value with bounds of +/-30, if subjects did not aggregate information at all, estimates' dispersion would have been constant at 15.
We test the statistical significance of the null that the level of estimates' dispersion is constant across subsequent turns using a non-parametric Wilcoxon matched-pairs signedranks test. The p-values from these tests are reported in lines 4 − 6 of Table 2 for the BLT and 10 − 12 of that table for the OCT. In the BLT, the level of estimates' dispersion decrease from turn 1 to turn 3 but not after that, in line with the rational model. In the OCT, we find similar pattern, delayed by a turn: there is a significant drop going from turn 1 to 2 and from 3 to 4 but not in between.
To quantify the convergence rate and measure how it is affected by the treatment, we estimate the following regressions model (treating the data as a panel), which interacts a treatment dummy with the log of the turn number:
where Dummy i takes the value of 1 if the observation was obtained under the OCT and 0 otherwise, and t is the turn number. This specification allows us to test parametrically the following hypotheses:
• Estimates' dispersion does not decrease across turns, i.e., β 2 = 0 and β 2 + β 3 = 0
• There is no difference, across treatments, in the initial level of estimates' dispersion, i.e., β 1 = 0
• There is no difference across treatments in the rate of estimates' dispersion convergence, i.e., β 3 = 0.
The estimation results are reported and depicted in Figure 5 . We find that in both treatments, the initial estimates' dispersion is virtually identical; β 1 is not statistically different from zero. This is consistent with the theoretical predictions in that beliefs about signal precision should not enter players' estimates in the first turn. Convergence in estimates occurs in both treatments; β 2 and β 2 + β 3 are statistically different from zero. However, the rate of convergence is substantially lower in the OCT compared with the BLT, as β 3 is positive and statistically different from zero.
Consistent with these results, we find that the level of estimates' dispersion is different across treatments. Rows 1 and 7 of Table 2 show that estimates' dispersion is higher in the OCT than in the BLT, with the exception of the first turn. As we would expect from the model (see Proposition 6, subjects' confidence does not enter their first turn estimates, and thus no difference is observed. In turns 2 to 4, estimates' dispersion in the OCT is roughly twice as high as in the BLT. Statistical non-parametric test confirm these observations. The last row in Table 2 reports the p-values of testing for treatment effects.
Excess levels of estimates' dispersion and imprecision
The analysis so far suggests that subjects form estimates that are further apart in the OCT than in the BLT, and that while these estimates get closer together as result of interaction, the rate of convergence is lower in the OCT. These findings are consistent with the results discussed in Section 5.1, which suggest that subjects' in the OCT are overconfident while those in the BLT are not.
But, are the results in the BLT consistent with the level predictions of the fully rational model? To answer that, we use the information held by subjects in each round to compute turn-by-turn predicted estimates and estimates' dispersion. Lines 2 and 8 of Table 2 report the level of estimates' dispersion derived from the fully rational model discussed in Section 3.2. This model serves as a baseline and thus does not allow for the possibility of either overconfidence or errors. Lines 6 and 12 in Table 2 report the p-values from testing equality between fully-rational predictions and observed levels for the BLT and OCT, respectively.
It may not be surprising to find that in the OCT estimates' dispersion levels are in excess of those predicted by the fully rational model. After all, we would expect these results from subjects' overconfidence. It is more surprising to find that estimates' dispersion levels are higher than predicted in the BLT too, while we find no evidence of overconfidence among subjects in that treatment.
We argue that these deviations from the fully-rational predictions are consistent with subjects best responding to errors in others' estimates. To explore this possibility, we approximate the best response function, discussed in Section 3.4, which suggested that:
where Θ(s i , a j,1 , ·) is a term that adjusts the observed estimate, a j,1 , based on player i's signal, player j's estimate, and player j's expected estimate error (see Figure 1 for an illustration). Since the functional form of Θ interacts observed variables with unobservedvariables in a way that does not allow for linear estimation, we approximate this function using a cubic function around s i − a j,1 . This allows estimation of the following linear model:
Much like the model estimates from equation 5, Section 5.1, we allow for the possibility that subjects are overconfident. We extend it to also account for the possibility that subjects 'discount' others' estimates, which appear to be either very high or very low. Since β 3 determines the steepness of the response in cases where other's estimate is away own signal, we test whether β 3 is equal to zero.
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 1 report the result for the BLT and OCT. In both treatments we find evidence consistent with rational response to errors. The coefficient associated with the term s i − a 3 j,1 is different from zero, at the 1% level. Further, this coefficient is positive, as predicted by the rational response to errors alternative. At the same time, we observed that this channel does not eliminate the overconfidence observed in the OCT as β 1 is substantially higher in the OCT, compared with the BLT, and exceeds 0.5, indicating that subjects assign too high a weight to their own signal in the OCT. In other words, we are able to separate overconfidence from the rational response to errors and show that both effect subjects' estimates.
Summary
In this paper we suggest a simple information aggregation game through which we studytheoretically and empirically -how participants aggregate multidimensional private infor-mation together with information learned indirectly from observing others' actions. In order to distinguish two widespread behavioral biases -erroneous actions and mistaken beliefs, we combine an experimental design, which controls for the presence of overconfidence, and a model that nests both biases. By doing so, we are able to measure subjects' confidence, in both variants of the experiment, along with their responses to errors.
We are able to estimate subjects' implicit overconfidence. We find that the treatment induces overconfidence in one set of sessions but not in the other. Taking advantage of this difference, we establish the effect of overconfidence by showing that it gives rise to more dispersed estimates and to lower rate of estimates' convergence. At the same time, we find support for the second form of deviation from full-rationality -errors in actions. In both treatments subjects' appear to respond to others' mistakes in forming their own estimates.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways. First, it suggests a theoretically tractable mechanism that can be used to study how individual biases affect information aggregation. This can be pursued further by changing the structure of information: one can introduce public announcement alongside private signals and replace exogenous endowment of private signals with endogenous acquisition of information. 17 Second, it provides an laboratory implementation in which subjects are endowed with private signals and private signal precision, and shows how to turn the latter into a treatment variable. Third, it shows how the fully-rational model can be extended to incorporate different deviations from rationality and how it can be used for empirical identification.
Appendix
Proofs
Proof. Proposition 1
Assume player j follows a * j,t . We will show that player i's dominant strategy is also characterized by a * i,t . In turn 3,
since a * j,1 , a * j,2 , a i,1 can be used by player i to back out q j . Hence, player i has fullinformation and she can do no better to submit a
2 ) = v a.s.. In turn 2, I i,2 = {s i , q i , s j } . Given that in turn 3 player i knows the fundamental value (a.s.), he can do no better than act myopically in turn 2. Therefore,
, player i will act myopically and submit
since by deviating she would reduce own payoffs without changing the information that can be extracted from player j's actions.
Proof. Proposition 2
We use backward induction for this proof. Since the myopic best-response equilibrium maximized expected payoffs at each turn of the game separately, player would deviate from it only if they could increase future payoffs. Since turn 3 is the last turn, it follows trivially that
actions are submitted simultaneously, this can not hold. Thus, in turn 2, a * i,2 = E(v|I i,2 ).
In turn 1, assume that
) so it must be the case that
(a * i,1 ))))) but since turn 3 actions arrive at full information revelation (a.s.), this can not hold.
Proof. Proposition 4
and −e j ≤ (s j − s i ) ≤ e j , we get that
Proof. Proposition 5
Replacing q i with q i and q j with q j , and following Proposition 4 proof, we get that:
Proof. Proposition 6
For turns 1 and 3 the proof is trivial.
For turn 2, recall that
Denoting (q i + q j ) ≡ q ij and (M C i + M C j ) ≡ M C ij , and squaring both sides of the expression we get:
To find the parameter value ranges for which the dispersion of estimates is increasing, take a derivative with respect to M C ij :
, which is increasing if
players are on average overconfident.
Derivation of Optimal Actions for the General Case (Section 3.2)
In this section, we derive players' optimal actions in each turn of the game under the general case. Since players' strategies are symmetric, we abuse notation and drop players' identification subscript when appropriate.
In turn 1, optimal actions are:
Computing each of these terms separately we get that:
That is, conditional on being a type l player, v is distributed uniformly around your signal, s i . The intuition is that in the interior case (s i ∈ [L+Y, H −Y ]) player i is uniformly distributed around v and v is drawn uniformly. Around v's distribution boundaries, the distribution mass is being reallocated uniformly.
To summarize, At the end of turn 1, a i,1 and a j,1 are announced. Therefore, turn 2 optimal actions are:
and a * j,1 (s j ) −1 is the inverse function of player j's turn 1 actions with respect to her q j .
Therefore:
Since a * j,1 (s j ) −1 cannot be explicitly derived, close form solutions to a * i,2 is difficult to obtain.
By the end of turn 2, all information is revealed (a.s.). Therefore, turn 3 optimal action is: ), a * j,3 This table reports panel-regression results of subjects' turn 2 estimates. In columns 1 and 2 we estimate the model a i,n,2 = α + β 1 s i,n + β 2 a j,n,1 + i,n , for each treatment separately. For rows 3 and 4 we estimate the model a i,n,2 = α + β 1 s i,n + β 2 a j,n,1 + β 3 (s i − a j,1 ) 3 + i,n , for each treatment separately. a i,n,2 corresponds to subject i's turn 2 estimate in round n. Likewise, a j,n,1 corresponds to subject j's turn 1 estimate in round n (subjects i and j are matched together in round n). s i,n corresponds to player i's signal in round n. 'Own signal', 'Other's estimate', and '(Own signalOther's estimate) 3 corresponds to β 1 , β 2 , and β 3 , respectively. Standard errors, reported in square brackets, are pulled by subjects. The table reports p-values associated with testing the null that the implied confidence is equal to the objective precision (using a non-parametric test). We exclude observations in which the implied confidence is not an admissible probability (outside the range 0 − 1). 
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